Redovisning for optioner in kanada

För sista gången: aktieoptioner är en kostnad Tiden har kommit för att avsluta debatten om redovisning av aktieoptioner kontroversen har pågått alldeles för länge. Faktum är att regeln för rapportering av verkställande aktieoptioner går tillbaka till 1972, då Redovisningsprincipen, föregångaren till FASB, utfärdat APB 25. Regeln angav att kostnaden för optioner vid beviljandet Datumet bör mätas med deras inneboende värdering av skillnaden mellan aktiens nuvarande marknadsvärde på aktien och optionsräntan för optionsrätten. Enligt denna metod tilldelades inga kostnader till optioner när deras lösenpris fastställdes till aktuellt marknadspris. Grunden för regeln var ganska enkel: Eftersom inga kontanter byter händer när bidraget görs är utgivning av aktieoptioner inte en ekonomiskt signifikant transaktion. Det var vad många tänkte på tiden. Vad mer var, var lite teori eller övning tillgänglig 1972 för att styra företag för att bestämma värdet av sådana orörda finansiella instrument. APB 25 var föråldrad inom ett år. Publiceringen 1973 av Black-Scholes-formulären utlöste en enorm boom på marknader för offentligt handlade alternativ, en rörelse förstärkt av öppnandet, även 1973, av Chicago Board Options Exchange. Det var inte något slump att tillväxten på de handlade optionsmarknaderna speglades av en ökande användning av aktieoptionsbidrag i ersättning för ledande befattningshavare och anställda. National Center for Employee Ownership uppskattar att nästan 10 miljoner anställda fick aktieoptioner år 2000 mindre än 1 miljon år 1990. Det blev snart klart i både teori och praktik att alternativ av något slag var värda långt mer än det inneboende värdet definierat av APB 25. FASB inledde en översyn av aktieoptionsbokföring 1984 och efter mer än ett decennium av uppvärmd kontrovers slutgavs slutligen SFAS 123 i oktober 1995. Det rekommenderades inte att företag skulle redovisa kostnaden för optioner som beviljats ​​och för att bestämma deras rättvisa marknadsvärde Med hjälp av option-pricing modeller. Den nya standarden var en kompromiss, vilket återspeglar intensiv lobbying av affärsmän och politiker mot obligatorisk rapportering. De hävdade att de verkställande aktieoptionerna var en av de avgörande komponenterna i den extraordinära ekonomiska renässansen i Amerika, så varje försök att ändra redovisningsreglerna för dem var en attack på Americas enormt framgångsrik modell för att skapa nya företag. Oundvikligen valde de flesta företag att ignorera den rekommendation som de motsatte sig så starkt och fortsatte att registrera endast det inneboende värdet vid tilldelningsdatum, vanligtvis noll, av sina optionsoptioner. Därefter gjorde den extraordinära uppsvinget i aktiekurserna att kritiker av optionsutgifter ser ut som spoilsports. Men sedan kraschen har debatten återvänt med en hämnd. Skenet av företagets bokföringskandaler har i synnerhet visat hur orealistiskt en bild av deras ekonomiska resultat många företag har målat i sina finansiella rapporter. Allt fler har investerare och tillsynsmyndigheter kommit att erkänna att optionsbaserad kompensation är en stor snedvridande faktor. Hade AOL Time Warner 2001 till exempel rapporterade personaloptionsutgifter enligt rekommendation av SFAS 123 skulle ha visat en rörelseminskning om cirka 1,7 miljarder i stället för de 700 miljoner i rörelseresultat som det faktiskt rapporterade. Vi anser att fallet för utgiftsoptioner är överväldigande, och på de följande sidorna undersöker och avvisar vi de huvudsakliga påståenden som framförts av dem som fortsätter att motsätta sig det. Vi visar att i motsats till dessa experters argument, aktieoptionsbidrag har reella kassaflödesimplikationer som måste rapporteras, att sättet att kvantifiera dessa konsekvenser är tillgängligt, är att fotnotupplysning inte är ett acceptabelt ersättning för att rapportera transaktionen i inkomst Redogörelse och balansräkningen och att fullständigt erkännande av optionskostnader inte behöver emasculate incitamenten för entreprenörsföretag. Vi diskuterar då bara hur företag kan gå om att redovisa kostnaden för optioner på sina resultaträkningar och balansräkningar. Fallacy 1: Aktieoptioner representerar inte en reell kostnad Det är en grundläggande bokföringsprincip att finansiella rapporter ska registrera ekonomiskt betydande transaktioner. Ingen tvivlar på att handlade alternativ uppfyller det kriteriet miljarder dollar som värderas köps och säljs varje dag, antingen i diskoteksmarknaden eller på börser. För många människor är dock företagsoptionsbidrag en annan historia. Dessa transaktioner är inte ekonomiskt signifikanta, argumentet går, för att inga pengar ändrar händer. Som tidigare American Express VD Harvey Golub uttryckte den i 8 augusti 2002, Wall Street Journal artikel, är optionsoptioner aldrig en kostnad för företaget och bör därför aldrig redovisas som en kostnad i resultaträkningen. Den ställningen trotsar den ekonomiska logiken, för att inte tala om sunt förnuft, i flera avseenden. För en början behöver värdetransporter inte innebära överföring av kontanter. Medan en transaktion med ett kvitto eller betalning är tillräckligt för att generera en inspelningsbar transaktion, är det inte nödvändigt. Händelser som utbyte av tillgångar, tecknande av ett leasingavtal, tillhandahållande av framtida pension eller semesterförmåner för nuvarande anställning eller förvärv av material på kredit alla utlösande bokföringstransaktioner, eftersom de innebär överföringar av värde, även om inga pengar ändras händer vid den tidpunkt då Transaktionen sker. Även om inga kontanter byter händer, utfärdar aktieoptioner till anställda ett kontantoffert, en möjlighetskostnad, som måste redovisas. Om ett företag skulle ge aktier i stället för alternativ till anställda skulle alla vara överens om att företagens kostnader för denna transaktion skulle vara det pengar som annars skulle ha fått om de hade sålt aktierna till det aktuella marknadspriset till investerare. Det är exakt detsamma med aktieoptioner. När ett företag ger optioner till anställda, ger det möjlighet att ta emot pengar från försäkringsgivare som kan ta samma alternativ och sälja dem på en konkurrensutsatt marknad för investerare. Warren Buffett gjorde denna punkt grafiskt i en kolumn i Washington Post den 9 april 2002, när han uppgav: Berkshire Hathaway kommer gärna att få alternativ i stället för pengar för många av de varor och tjänster som vi säljer Amerika. Att ge optioner till anställda snarare än att sälja dem till leverantörer eller investerare via försäkringsgivare innebär en faktisk förlust av pengar till företaget. Det kan givetvis vara mer rimligt argumenterat för att kontanter som försvunnits genom att utfärda optioner till anställda, istället för att sälja dem till investerare, kompenseras av de pengar som bolaget sparar genom att betala sina anställda mindre pengar. Som två allmänt respekterade ekonomer, Burton G. Malkiel och William J. Baumol, noterade i en 4 april 2002 Wall Street Journalartikel: Ett nytt företagande företag kanske inte kan tillhandahålla den kontanta ersättning som behövs för att locka utestående arbetstagare. Istället kan det erbjuda aktieoptioner. Men Malkiel och Baumol följer tyvärr inte sin observation till sin logiska slutsats. För om kostnaden för optionsoptioner inte införlivas universellt i mätningen av nettoresultatet, kommer företag som beviljar optioner att underrätta kompensationskostnaderna och det går inte att jämföra deras lönsamhet, produktivitet och kapitaltillskott med ekonomiskt Likvärdiga företag som bara har strukturerat sitt kompensationssystem på ett annat sätt. Följande hypotetiska illustration visar hur det kan hända. Tänk dig två företag, KapCorp och MerBod, som konkurrerar i exakt samma bransch. De två skiljer sig endast i strukturen i deras ersättningspaket för anställda. KapCorp betalar sina anställda 400 000 i kompensation i form av kontanter under året. Vid årets början utfärdar den också genom 100.000 teckningsoptioner på kapitalmarknaden, som inte kan utnyttjas under ett år, och det krävs att anställda använder 25 av sina ersättningar för att köpa de nyemitterade optionerna. Nettokassaflödet till KapCorp är 300 000 (400 000 i kompensationsutgifter minus 100 000 från försäljningen av optionerna). MerBods tillvägagångssätt är bara lite annorlunda. Det betalar sina anställda 300 000 i kontanter och ger dem direkt 100 000 valmöjligheter i början av året (med samma ettåriga övningsbegränsningar). Ekonomiskt sett är de två positionerna identiska. Varje företag har betalat totalt 400 000 i ersättning, varje har utfärdat 100 000 värden av optioner, och för varje nettokassaflöde uppgår 300 000 efter det att kontanter som erhållits från utfärdandet av optionerna subtraheras från de pengar som betalats till ersättning. Anställda hos båda företagen håller samma 100 000 alternativ under året, vilket ger samma motivation, incitament och kvarhållande effekter. Hur legitim är en redovisningsstandard som tillåter två ekonomiskt identiska transaktioner att producera radikalt olika siffror Vid utarbetandet av bokslutskommunikén kommer KapCorp att boka kompensationsutgifter på 400 000 och visar 100 000 i optioner på balansräkningen på eget kapital konto. Om kostnaden för teckningsoptioner emitterade till anställda inte redovisas som en kostnad kommer MerBod dock att boka en kompensationskostnad på endast 300 000 och inte visa några optioner som emitterats i balansräkningen. Om man antar annorlunda intäkter och kostnader, kommer det att se ut som om MerBods vinst var 100 000 högre än KapCorps. MerBod verkar också ha en lägre kapitalbas än KapCorp, även om ökningen av antalet utestående aktier i slutändan kommer att vara densamma för båda företagen om alla optioner utövas. Till följd av den lägre kompensationsutgiften och den lägre kapitalpositionen framträder MerBods prestanda med de flesta analytiska åtgärder som överlägsen KapCorps. Denna snedvridning uppges naturligtvis varje år att de två företagen väljer olika former av ersättning. Hur berättigad är en redovisningsstandard som tillåter två ekonomiskt identiska transaktioner att producera radikalt olika siffror. Fallacy 2: Kostnaden för anställdas aktieoptioner kan inte uppskattas Vissa motståndare till optionsutgifter försvarar sin position på praktiska, inte konceptuella grunder. Alternativ-prissättningsmodeller kan fungera, säger de, som en vägledning för värdering av köpoptioner. Men de kan inte fånga värdet på personaloptioner, som är privata avtal mellan företaget och medarbetaren för illikvida instrument som inte kan fritt säljas, bytas, ställas som säkerhet eller säkras. Det är verkligen sant att i allmänhet ett instrument som saknar likviditet kommer att minska sitt värde för innehavaren. Men innehavarnas likviditetsförlust spelar ingen roll för vad det kostar emittenten att skapa instrumentet om emittenten på något sätt dra nytta av bristen på likviditet. Och för aktieoptioner har avsaknaden av en likvida marknad liten inverkan på deras värde för innehavaren. Den stora skönheten av alternativ-prissättningsmodeller är att de bygger på egenskaperna hos det underliggande lageret. Det är just därför de har bidragit till den extraordinära tillväxten av optionsmarknader de senaste 30 åren. Black-Scholes-priset på ett alternativ motsvarar värdet av en portfölj av aktier och kontanter som hanteras dynamiskt för att replikera utbetalningarna till det alternativet. Med en helt likvida aktiekapital kunde en annars obestridd investerare helt säkra en optionsrisk och extrahera sitt värde genom att sälja kort den återkommande portföljen av aktier och kontanter. I så fall skulle likviditetsrabatten på optionsvärdet vara minimal. Och det gäller även om det inte fanns någon marknad för handel alternativet direkt. Därför leder likviditetsmaktens avsaknad av marknader i aktieoptioner inte i sig en rabatt i optionsvärdet till innehavaren. Investeringsbanker, affärsbanker och försäkringsbolag har nu gått långt bortom den grundläggande 30-årige Black-Scholes-modellen för att utveckla metoder för prissättning av alla slags alternativ: Standard. Exotiska. Optioner som handlas via mellanhänder, över disken och på utbyten. Alternativ kopplade till valutafluktuationer. Alternativ inbäddade i komplexa värdepapper, såsom konvertibel skuld, preferenslagret eller inkaldningsbar skuld som hypotekslån med förskottsegenskaper eller räntehattar och - golv. En hel delindustri har utvecklats för att hjälpa individer, företag och penningmarknadschefer att köpa och sälja dessa komplexa värdepapper. Nuvarande finansiell teknik tillåter visserligen att företagen införlivar alla funktioner hos personaloptioner i en prissättningsmodell. Några investeringsbanker kommer till och med att citera priser för chefer som vill säkra eller sälja sina optionsrätter före intjäning, om deras företags optionsplan tillåter det. Självklart uppskattar formelbaserade eller försäkringsgivare om kostnaden för personaloptioner är mindre exakta än kontantutbetalningar eller delaktigheter. Men bokslutet bör sträva efter att vara ungefär rätt i att återspegla den ekonomiska verkligheten snarare än exakt fel. Cheferna beräknar rutinmässigt uppskattningar av viktiga kostnadsposter, såsom avskrivningar på anläggningstillgångar och avsättningar mot ansvarsförbindelser, såsom framtida miljöreningar och uppgörelser från produktansvar och andra processer. Vid beräkningen av kostnaderna för anställdas pensioner och andra pensionsförmåner använder chefer exempelvis aktuarmässiga uppskattningar av framtida räntor, anställningsuppehållsräntor, anställdas pensioneringsdatum, anställdas livslängd och deras makar samt eskalering av framtida medicinska kostnader. Prissättningsmodeller och lång erfarenhet gör det möjligt att uppskatta kostnaden för optionsoptioner som emitterats under en given period med en precision som är jämförbar med eller större än många av dessa andra poster som redan finns på företagens resultaträkningar och balansräkningar. Inte alla invändningar mot att använda Black-Scholes och andra optionsvärderingsmodeller bygger på svårigheter att uppskatta kostnaden för optionerna. Till exempel hävdade John DeLong, i ett paper of Competitive Enterprise Institute i juni 2002 med titeln Stock Options Controversy och New Economy, att även om ett värde beräknades enligt en modell skulle beräkningen kräva justering för att återspegla värdet för arbetstagaren. Han är bara hälften rätt. Genom att betala anställda med egna aktier eller optioner tvingar företaget dem att hålla höga icke-diversifierade finansiella portföljer, en risk som ytterligare förblir av investeringen av de anställdas egna humankapital i företaget också. Eftersom nästan alla individer är riskfyllda kan vi förvänta oss att anställda lägger betydligt mindre värde på deras optionspaket än andra, bättre diversifierade investerare skulle. Uppskattningar av omfattningen av denna riskfaktor för dödvikt för anställda, eftersom det ibland kallas från 20 till 50, beroende på volatiliteten hos den underliggande aktien och graden av diversifiering av de anställdas portfölj. Förekomsten av denna dödviktskostnad används ibland för att motivera den uppenbarligen stora omfattningen av optionsbaserad ersättning utdelad till toppledare. Ett företag som till exempel vill belöna sin VD med 1 miljon i alternativ som är värda 1.000 vardera på marknaden kan (kanske perversigt) anledningen att det ska utfärda 2000 i stället för 1000 alternativ, eftersom vd: s perspektiv är alternativen värda Bara 500 vardera. (Vi vill påpeka att denna resonemang bekräftar vår tidigare punkt att alternativ är en ersättning för kontanter.) Men medan det kanske skulle vara rimligt att ta hänsyn till dödviktskostnaden när man bestämmer hur mycket aktiebaserad ersättning (som alternativ) ska inkluderas i En ledningspaket för verkställande direktörer är det verkligen inte rimligt att låta kostnaden för dödkostnaden påverka hur företag registrerar kostnaderna för paketen. Bokslutet speglar företagets ekonomiska perspektiv, inte de enheter (inklusive anställda) som det handlar om. När ett företag säljer en produkt till en kund, t ex behöver den inte verifiera vad produkten är värd för den personen. Det räknar den förväntade kontantbetalningen i transaktionen som dess intäkter. På samma sätt när företaget köper en produkt eller tjänst från en leverantör undersöker den inte huruvida det betalade priset var större eller mindre än leverantörerna kostade eller vad leverantören kunde ha fått om den sålde produkten eller tjänsten på annat håll. Företaget registrerar köpeskillingen som kontanter eller kontanta medel som den offrade för att förvärva godet eller tjänsten. Antag att en klädtillverkare skulle bygga ett gym för sina anställda. Företaget skulle inte göra det för att tävla med gymklubbar. Det skulle bygga upp centret för att generera högre intäkter från ökad produktivitet och kreativitet hos hälsosammare, lyckligare anställda och för att minska kostnader som uppstår på grund av anställdas omsättning och sjukdom. Kostnaden för företaget är klart kostnaden för att bygga och bibehålla anläggningen, inte det värde som de enskilda anställda kan placera på den. Kostnaden för fitnesscentret redovisas som en periodisk kostnad, löst anpassad till förväntad omsättningsökning och minskning av anställningsrelaterade kostnader. Den enda rimliga motiveringen vi har sett för att kosta verkställande alternativ under deras marknadsvärde härrör från observationen att många alternativ förverkas när anställda lämnar eller utövas för tidigt på grund av riskaversionen för anställda. I dessa fall späds det befintliga eget kapitalet mindre än vad det annars skulle vara, eller inte alls, vilket leder till att företagets kompensationskostnad minskar. Medan vi håller med den grundläggande logiken i detta argument kan effekterna av förverkande och tidig övning på teoretiska värden vara grovt överdrivna. (Se den verkliga effekten av förverkande och tidig övning i slutet av den här artikeln.) Verkliga effekter av förverkande och tidig övning Till skillnad från kontantlön kan inte aktieoptioner överföras från den enskildes som beviljats ​​dem till någon annan. Nontransferability har två effekter som kombinerar för att göra anställningsalternativ mindre värdefulla än konventionella alternativ som handlas på marknaden. För det första förlorar sina anställda sina möjligheter om de lämnar företaget innan optionerna har inneburit. För det andra tenderar anställda att minska risken genom att utnyttja innehavna aktieoptioner mycket tidigare än en väl diversifierad investerare skulle, vilket skulle minska potentialen för en mycket högre utdelning om de hade alternativen till förfallodagen. Anställda med inlånade optioner som finns i pengarna kommer också att utöva dem när de slutar, eftersom de flesta företag kräver att anställda använder eller förlorar sina möjligheter vid avgång. I båda fallen reduceras de ekonomiska konsekvenserna för bolaget att utfärda optionerna, eftersom värdet och den relativa storleken på de befintliga aktieägarnas insatser utspädes mindre än vad de kunde ha varit eller inte alls. Med tanke på den ökade sannolikheten för att företagen kommer att behöva bekosta aktieoptioner, kämpar vissa motståndare med en rearguard-åtgärd genom att försöka övertyga standard setter att avsevärt minska de redovisade kostnaderna för dessa alternativ, diskontera deras värde från det som mäts av finansiella modeller för att återspegla den starka Sannolikhet för förverkande och tidig träning. Aktuella förslag som dessa personer lägger fram för FASB och IASB skulle göra det möjligt för företagen att uppskatta andelen optioner som förverkats under intjänandeperioden och minska kostnaden för optionsbidrag med detta belopp. I stället för att använda utgångsdatumet för optionslivet i en optionsprissättningsmodell, försöker förslagen att tillåta företag att använda ett förväntat liv för möjligheten att spegla sannolikheten för tidig träning. Att använda ett förväntat liv (vilket företag kan uppskatta nära intjänandeperioden, säg fyra år) istället för kontraktsperioden, t ex tio år, skulle avsevärt minska den uppskattade kostnaden för optionen. Vissa justeringar bör göras för förverkande och tidig träning. Men den föreslagna metoden överstiger avsevärt kostnadsminskningen, eftersom den försummar omständigheterna under vilka alternativ som sannolikt kommer att förverkas eller utövas tidigt. När hänsyn tas till dessa omständigheter är minskningen av kostnader för personaloptioner sannolikt mycket mindre. Först betrakta förverkande. Om du använder en tom andel för förverkan baserat på historisk eller potentiell anställd är omsättningen endast giltig om förverkande är en slumpmässig händelse, som ett lotteri, oberoende av aktiekursen. I verkligheten är sannolikheten för förverkande emellertid negativt relaterad till värdet av de förverkade optionerna och därmed själva aktiekursen. Människor är mer benägna att lämna ett företag och förlora alternativ när aktiekursen har minskat och alternativen är värda lite. Men om företaget har gjort det bra och aktiekursen har ökat betydligt sedan tilldelningsdatumet, kommer alternativen att bli mycket mer värdefulla, och anställda blir mycket mindre benägna att lämna. Om anställdas omsättning och förverkande är mer sannolikt när alternativen är minst värdefulla, reduceras lite av alternativen totala kostnaden vid tilldelningsdatum på grund av sannolikheten för förverkande. Argumentet för tidig träning är liknande. Det beror också på framtida aktiekurs. Anställda tenderar att träna tidigt om de flesta av sin förmögenhet är bunden i företaget, de måste diversifiera och de har inget annat sätt att minska riskrisken mot bolagets aktiekurs. Ledande befattningshavare, dock med de största optionsinnehav, är osannolikt att träna tidigt och förstöra optionsvärdet när aktiekursen har ökat väsentligt. Ofta äger de obegränsat lager, vilket de kan sälja som ett effektivare sätt att minska riskrisken. Eller de har tillräckligt med för att ingå avtal med en investeringsbank för att säkra sina optionspositioner utan att utöva för tidigt. Liksom med förverkandefunktionen skulle beräkningen av ett förväntat optionsliv utan hänsyn till omfattningen av innehav av anställda som utövar tidigt eller på grund av deras förmåga att säkra deras risker på annat sätt avsevärt underskatta kostnaden för de beviljade optionerna. Optionsprissättningsmodeller kan modifieras för att införa påverkan av aktiekurserna och omfattningen av anställdas option och aktieinnehav på sannolikheten för förverkande och tidig övning. (Se till exempel Mark Rubinsteins Fall 1995-artikel i Journal of Derivatives. Om redovisningsvärdering av personaloptioner.) Den faktiska storleken på dessa justeringar måste baseras på specifika företagsdata, såsom uppskattning av börskurs och distribution av Optionsbidrag bland anställda. De justeringar som bedömdes korrekt skulle kunna visa sig vara betydligt mindre än de föreslagna beräkningarna (uppenbarligen godkänd av FASB och IASB) skulle producera. Faktum är att för vissa företag kan en beräkning som ignorerar förverkande och tidig övning helt och hållet komma närmare den verkliga kostnaden för alternativ än en som helt ignorerar de faktorer som påverkar anställdas förverkande och tidiga övningsbeslut. Fallacy 3: Lageroptionskostnaderna är redan tillräckligt avslöjade Ett annat argument för att försvara det befintliga tillvägagångssättet är att företagen redan lämnar information om kostnaden för optionsbidrag i fotnoterna till bokslutet. Investerare och analytiker som vill justera resultaträkningar för kostnaden för optioner har därför de nödvändiga uppgifterna lättillgängliga. Vi finner det argumentet svårt att svälja. Som vi har påpekat är det en grundläggande princip för redovisning att resultaträkningen och balansräkningen ska skildra en företags underliggande ekonomi. Att förnedra en sak av så stor ekonomisk betydelse som anställningsoptioner till fotnoter skulle systematiskt snedvrida dessa rapporter. Men även om vi skulle acceptera principen att fotnotupplysning är tillräckligt, skulle vi i verkligheten finna det en dålig ersättare för att redovisa utgiften direkt på de primära uttalandena. I början använder investeringsanalytiker, advokater och tillsynsmyndigheter nu elektroniska databaser för att beräkna lönsamhetsförhållanden baserat på siffrorna i bolagets reviderade resultaträkningar och balansräkningar. En analytiker som följer ett enskilt företag, eller till och med en liten grupp av företag, kan göra justeringar för information som beskrivs i fotnoter. Men det skulle vara svårt och dyrt att göra för en stor grupp företag som hade lagt olika typer av data i olika icke-standardformat i fotnoter. Det är uppenbart att det är mycket lättare att jämföra företag på lika villkor, där alla ersättningskostnader har införlivats i inkomstnumren. Vad mer är, siffror som anges i fotnoter kan vara mindre tillförlitliga än de som redovisas i den primära bokslutet. För en sak granskar chefer och revisorer oftast kompletterande fotnoter sist och ägnar mindre tid till dem än de gör i siffrorna i de primära uttalandena. Som ett exempel visar fotnoten i eBays FY 2000 årsredovisning ett vägt genomsnittligt tilldelningsvärde på optioner som beviljats ​​under 1999 av 105,03 för ett år där det vägda genomsnittliga lösenpriset för aktier som beviljats ​​var 64,59. Bara hur värdet av de tilldelade optionerna kan vara 63 mer än värdet av det underliggande lagret är inte uppenbart. I juli 2000 rapporterades samma effekt: ett verkligt värde på optioner som beviljats ​​103,79 med ett genomsnittligt lösenpris på 62,69. Tydligen upptäcktes detta fel äntligen, eftersom FY 2001-rapporten retroaktivt justerade de genomsnittliga tilldelningsdagarna för 1999 och 2000 till 40,45 respektive 41,40. Vi tror att chefer och revisorer kommer att utöva större noggrannhet och bryr sig om att få tillförlitliga uppskattningar av kostnaden för aktieoptioner om dessa siffror ingår i företagens resultaträkningar än vad de för närvarande gör för fotnotupplysning. Vår kollega William Sahlman i sin HBR-artikel i december 2002, Utgiftsoptioner löser ingenting, har uttryckt oro för att den mängd information som finns i fotnoterna om de optioner som erbjuds skulle gå förlorad om alternativen kostnadsfördes. Men säkerställande av kostnaden för optioner i resultaträkningen utesluter inte att fortsätta tillhandahålla en fotnot som förklarar den underliggande fördelningen av bidrag och metoden och parametervärdena som används för att beräkna kostnaden för optionsoptionerna. Några kritiker av aktieoptionsutgifter argumenterar, som venturekapitalist John Doerr och FedEx VD Frederick Smith gjorde i en kolumn från 5 april 2002, New York Times, att om utgifter krävdes skulle effekterna av optioner räknas två gånger i vinst per aktie : Först som en potentiell utspädning av resultatet, genom att öka utestående aktier och andra som avgift mot redovisat resultat. Resultatet skulle vara felaktigt och vilseledande vinst per aktie. Vi har flera svårigheter med detta argument. För det första uppgår optionskostnaderna endast till en (GAAP-baserad) utspädd vinst per aktieberäkning när nuvarande marknadspris överstiger optionsutnyttjandepriset. Således ignorerar helt utspädda EPS-nummer alla kostnader för alternativ som är nästan i pengarna eller kan bli i pengarna om aktiekursen ökat betydligt på kort sikt. För det andra, att avskräcka bestämningen av de ekonomiska effekterna av aktieoptionsbidrag uteslutande till en EPS-beräkning snedvrider väsentligt mätningen av redovisad inkomst, skulle inte justeras för att återspegla de ekonomiska konsekvenserna av optionskostnader. Dessa åtgärder är mer signifikanta sammanfattningar av förändringen av ett företags ekonomiska värde än den proraterade fördelningen av denna inkomst till enskilda aktieägare som avslöjades i EPS-åtgärden. Detta blir tydligt klart när det tas till sin logiska absurditet: Antag att företagen skulle kompensera alla sina leverantörer av material, arbetskraft, energi och köpta tjänster med aktieoptioner snarare än med kontanter och undvika all kostnadsåterkänning i resultaträkningen. Deras inkomster och lönsamhetsåtgärder skulle alla vara så grovt uppblåsta att de inte är användbara för analytiska ändamål. Endast EPS-numret skulle hämta någon ekonomisk effekt från optionsbidragen. Vår största invändning mot denna falska påstående är emellertid att även en beräkning av fullt utspädd EPS inte fullt ut återspeglar de ekonomiska effekterna av optionsoptioner. Följande hypotetiska exempel illustrerar problemen, men för enkelhets skull kommer vi att använda anslag av aktier istället för alternativ. Skälen är exakt densamma för båda fallen. Låt oss säga att var och en av våra två hypotetiska företag, KapCorp och MerBod, har 8 000 aktier utestående, ingen skuld och årliga intäkter i år på 100 000. KapCorp beslutar att betala sina anställda och leverantörer 90 000 kontant och har inga andra utgifter. MerBod kompenserar emellertid sina anställda och leverantörer med 80 000 i kontanter och 2.000 aktier av aktier, till ett genomsnittligt marknadspris på 5 per aktie. Kostnaden för varje företag är densamma: 90 000. Men deras nettoinkomst och EPS-nummer är väldigt olika. KapCorps nettoresultat före skatt är 10 000, eller 1,25 per aktie. Däremot rapporterade MerBods nettoresultat (vilket ignorerar kostnaden för eget kapital till anställda och leverantörer) är 20 000 och dess EPS är 2,00 (vilket tar hänsyn till de nya aktierna). Naturligtvis har de två företagen nu olika kontanta medel och antal utestående aktier med ett krav på dem. Men KapCorp kan eliminera denna skillnad genom att utge 2000 aktier av aktier på marknaden under året till ett genomsnittligt försäljningspris på 5 per aktie. Nu har båda företagen stängda kontanter på 20 000 och 10 000 aktier utestående. Enligt nuvarande redovisningsregler förvärrar denna transaktion emellertid endast skillnaden mellan EPS-numren. KapCorps redovisade intäkter förblir 10 000, eftersom det ytterligare 10 000 värdet från försäljningen av aktierna inte redovisas i nettoresultatet, men dess EPS-nämnare har ökat från 8 000 till 10 000. Följaktligen rapporterar KapCorp nu en EPS på 1,00 till MerBods 2,00, trots att deras ekonomiska positioner är identiska: 10 000 aktier utestående och ökade kontantsaldon på 20 000. De människor som hävdar att expensering av alternativ skapar ett dubbelräknande problem är att de själva skapar en rökskärm för att dölja de inkomstförvrängande effekterna av optionsoptioner. De människor som hävdar att expensering av alternativ skapar ett dubbelräknande problem är att de själva skapar en rökskärm för att dölja de inkomstförvrängande effekterna av optionsoptioner. Om vi ​​säger att den fullt utspädda EPS-siffran är det rätta sättet att avslöja effekterna av aktieoptionerna, bör vi omedelbart ändra de nuvarande redovisningsreglerna för situationer när företag utfärdar stamaktier, konvertibelt preferensaktier eller konvertibla obligationer att betala för Tjänster eller tillgångar. För närvarande, när dessa transaktioner inträffar, mäts kostnaden med det verkliga marknadsvärdet av den aktuella ersättningen. Why should options be treated differently Fallacy 4: Expensing Stock Options Will Hurt Young Businesses Opponents of expensing options also claim that doing so will be a hardship for entrepreneurial high-tech firms that do not have the cash to attract and retain the engineers and executives who translate entrepreneurial ideas into profitable, long-term growth. This argument is flawed on a number of levels. For a start, the people who claim that option expensing will harm entrepreneurial incentives are often the same people who claim that current disclosure is adequate for communicating the economics of stock option grants. The two positions are clearly contradictory. If current disclosure is sufficient, then moving the cost from a footnote to the balance sheet and income statement will have no market effect. But to argue that proper costing of stock options would have a significant adverse impact on companies that make extensive use of them is to admit that the economics of stock options, as currently disclosed in footnotes, are not fully reflected in companies market prices. More seriously, however, the claim simply ignores the fact that a lack of cash need not be a barrier to compensating executives. Rather than issuing options directly to employees, companies can always issue them to underwriters and then pay their employees out of the money received for those options. Considering that the market systematically puts a higher value on options than employees do, companies are likely to end up with more cash from the sale of externally issued options (which carry with them no deadweight costs) than they would by granting options to employees in lieu of higher salaries. Even privately held companies that raise funds through angel and venture capital investors can take this approach. The same procedures used to place a value on a privately held company can be used to estimate the value of its options, enabling external investors to provide cash for options about as readily as they provide cash for stock. Thats not to say, of course, that entrepreneurs should never get option grants. Venture capital investors will always want employees to be compensated with some stock options in lieu of cash to be assured that the employees have some skin in the game and so are more likely to be honest when they tout their companys prospects to providers of new capital. But that does not preclude also raising cash by selling options externally to pay a large part of the cash compensation to employees. We certainly recognize the vitality and wealth that entrepreneurial ventures, particularly those in the high-tech sector, bring to the U. S. economy. A strong case can be made for creating public policies that actively assist these companies in their early stages, or even in their more established stages. The nation should definitely consider a regulation that makes entrepreneurial, job-creating companies healthier and more competitive by changing something as simple as an accounting journal entry. But we have to question the effectiveness of the current rule, which essentially makes the benefits from a deliberate accounting distortion proportional to companies use of one particular form of employee compensation. After all, some entrepreneurial, job-creating companies might benefit from picking other forms of incentive compensation that arguably do a better job of aligning executive and shareholder interests than conventional stock options do. Indexed or performance options, for example, ensure that management is not rewarded just for being in the right place at the right time or penalized just for being in the wrong place at the wrong time. A strong case can also be made for the superiority of properly designed restricted stock grants and deferred cash payments. Yet current accounting standards require that these, and virtually all other compensation alternatives, be expensed. Are companies that choose those alternatives any less deserving of an accounting subsidy than Microsoft, which, having granted 300 million options in 2001 alone, is by far the largest issuer of stock options A less distorting approach for delivering an accounting subsidy to entrepreneurial ventures would simply be to allow them to defer some percentage of their total employee compensation for some number of years, which could be indefinitelyjust as companies granting stock options do now. That way, companies could get the supposed accounting benefits from not having to report a portion of their compensation costs no matter what form that compensation might take. What Will Expensing Involve Although the economic arguments in favor of reporting stock option grants on the principal financial statements seem to us to be overwhelming, we do recognize that expensing poses challenges. For a start, the benefits accruing to the company from issuing stock options occur in future periods, in the form of increased cash flows generated by its option motivated and retained employees. The fundamental matching principle of accounting requires that the costs of generating those higher revenues be recognized at the same time the revenues are recorded. This is why companies match the cost of multiperiod assets such as plant and equipment with the revenues these assets produce over their economic lives. In some cases, the match can be based on estimates of the future cash flows. In expensing capitalized software-development costs, for instance, managers match the costs against a predicted pattern of benefits accrued from selling the software. In the case of options, however, managers would have to estimate an equivalent pattern of benefits arising from their own decisions and activities. That would likely introduce significant measurement error and provide opportunities for managers to bias their estimates. We therefore believe that using a standard straight-line amortization formula will reduce measurement error and management bias despite some loss of accuracy. The obvious period for the amortization is the useful economic life of the granted option, probably best measured by the vesting period. Thus, for an option vesting in four years, 148 of the cost of the option would be expensed through the income statement in each month until the option vests. This would treat employee option compensation costs the same way the costs of plant and equipment or inventory are treated when they are acquired through equity instruments, such as in an acquisition. In addition to being reported on the income statement, the option grant should also appear on the balance sheet. In our opinion, the cost of options issued represents an increase in shareholders equity at the time of grant and should be reported as paid-in capital. Some experts argue that stock options are more like contingent liability than equity transactions since their ultimate cost to the company cannot be determined until employees either exercise or forfeit their options. This argument, of course, ignores the considerable economic value the company has sacrificed at time of grant. Whats more, a contingent liability is usually recognized as an expense when it is possible to estimate its value and the liability is likely to be incurred. At time of grant, both these conditions are met. The value transfer is not just probable it is certain. The company has granted employees an equity security that could have been issued to investors and suppliers who would have given cash, goods, and services in return. The amount sacrificed can also be estimated, using option-pricing models or independent estimates from investment banks. There has to be, of course, an offsetting entry on the asset side of the balance sheet. FASB, in its exposure draft on stock option accounting in 1994, proposed that at time of grant an asset called prepaid compensation expense be recognized, a recommendation we endorse. FASB, however, subsequently retracted its proposal in the face of criticism that since employees can quit at any time, treating their deferred compensation as an asset would violate the principle that a company must always have legal control over the assets it reports. We feel that FASB capitulated too easily to this argument. The firm does have an asset because of the option grantpresumably a loyal, motivated employee. Even though the firm does not control the asset in a legal sense, it does capture the benefits. FASBs concession on this issue subverted substance to form. Finally, there is the issue of whether to allow companies to revise the income number theyve reported after the grants have been issued. Some commentators argue that any recorded stock option compensation expense should be reversed if employees forfeit the options by leaving the company before vesting or if their options expire unexercised. But if companies were to mark compensation expense downward when employees forfeit their options, should they not also mark it up when the share price rises, thereby increasing the market value of the options Clearly, this can get complicated, and it comes as no surprise that neither FASB nor IASB recommends any kind of postgrant accounting revisions, since that would open up the question of whether to use mark-to-market accounting for all types of assets and liabilities, not just share options. At this time, we dont have strong feelings about whether the benefits from mark-to-market accounting for stock options exceed the costs. But we would point out that people who object to estimating the cost of options granted at time of issue should be even less enthusiastic about reestimating their options cost each quarter. We recognize that options are a powerful incentive, and we believe that all companies should consider them in deciding how to attract and retain talent and align the interests of managers and owners. But we also believe that failing to record a transaction that creates such powerful effects is economically indefensible and encourages companies to favor options over alternative compensation methods. It is not the proper role of accounting standards to distort executive and employee compensation by subsidizing one form of compensation relative to all others. Companies should choose compensation methods according to their economic benefitsnot the way they are reported. It is not the proper role of accounting standards to distort executive and employee compensation by subsidizing one form of compensation relative to all others. A version of this article appeared in the March 2003 issue of Harvard Business Review. Stock Options (Incentive) This article is about Incentive Stock Options, not market stock options which are traded in the public markets. Incentive Stock options are often referred to as SARs - Stock Appreciation Rights. This discussion applies mainly to the Canadian market and entities taxed by the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency ( CCRA ). Theres rarely an occasion when stock options dont come up as a favorite conversation topic among high tech entrepreneurs and CEOs. Many CEOs view options as the way of attracting top talent from the USA and elsewhere. This article deals with the question of employee stock options mainly as they relate to public companies. However, stock options are just as popular with private companies (especially those planning a future public offering). Why not just give shares In the case of both private and public companies, stock options are used instead of simply quotgivingquot shares to employees. This is done for tax reasons. The only time when shares can be quotgivenquot without adverse tax consequences is when a company is founded, i. e. when the shares have a zero value. At this stage, founders and employees can all be given stock (instead of options). But as a company evolves, the shares grow in value. If an investment is made into the company, the shares assume a value. If shares are then just quotgivenquot to someone, that person is deemed to have been compensated at whatever the fair market value is of those shares and is subject to that income. But stock option grants are not taxable at the time of being granted. Hence, their popularity. But, as much as Im a big fan of options, I thought it might be useful to devote most if this article to explain what they are, how they work, and some very serious and onerous implications for both option holders, the company, and investors. In theory and in a perfect world, options are wonderful. I love the concept: Your company grants you (as an employee, director, or advisor) an option to buy some shares in the company. An option is simply a contractual right given to the option holder (the optionee) whereby the holder has the irrevocable right to buy a certain number of shares in the company at a specified price. For example, a new recruit at Multiactive Software (TSX:E) could be granted 10,000 options allowing her (lets call her Jill) to buy 10,000 shares in Multiactive at a price of 3.00 (thats the trading price on the date of granting the options) anytime up to a period of 5 years. It should be noted that there are no prescribed rules or terms associated with options. They are discretionary and each option agreement, or grant, is unique. Generally, though, the quotrulesquot are: 1)the number of options granted to an individual depends on that employees quotvaluequot. This varies greatly from company to company. The Board if directors makes the decision as to how many options to grant. Theres a lot of discretion. 2)the total number of options outstanding at any one time is generally limited to 20 of the total number of issued shares (in the case of Multiactive, some 60 million shares were issued, hence there could be as many as 12 million stock options). In some cases, the number can be as high as 30 and historically, the number has been around 10 - but thats increasing due to the popularity of options. 3)options are not granted to a company - only to people (although this is changing somewhat to allow firms to provide services). 4)the exercise price (the price at which shares can be bought) is close to the trading (market) price on the date of the grant. NB - although companies can give a slight discount, i. e. up to 10, tax problems may arise (gets complicated). 5)technically, shareholders must approve all options granted (usually done by approving a stock option quotplanquot). 6)options are generally valid for a number of years ranging anywhere from 1 to 5 years. Ive seen some cases where they are valid for 10 years (for private companies, they may be valid forever once they have vested. Options may be the best way, tax-wise, through which new people can be brought on board, instead of simply giving them shares which have inherent value). 7)options may require quotvestingquot - i. e. if an employee gets 10,000 options, they can only be exercised over time, e. g. one-third get vested each year over 3 years. This prevents people from benefiting prematurely and cashing in before really having contributed to the company. This is at the discretion of the company - it is not a regulatory matter. 8)there are no tax liabilities (no taxes due) at the time when options are granted (But big headaches can occur later when options are exercised AND when shares are sold) In the ideal scenario, Jill - the new technical recruit at Multiactive - gets right into her work, and due to her efforts and those of her co-workers, Multiactive does well and its stock price goes to 6.00 by yearend. Jill can now (provided her options have quotvestedquot) exercise her options, i. e. buy shares at 3.00. Of course, she doesnt have 30,000 in spare change lying around, so she calls her broker and explains that she is an optionee. Her broker will then sell 10,000 shares for her at 6.00 and, upon her instructions, send 30,000 to the company in exchange for 10,000 newly issued shares pursuant to the option agreement. She has a 30,000 profit - a nice bonus for her efforts. Jill exercises and sells all of her 10,000 shares on the same day. Her tax liability is calculated on her 30,000 profit which is viewed as employment income - not a capital gain. She gets taxed as if she got a paycheque from the company (in fact - the company will issue her a T4 income tax slip next February so that she can then pay her taxes in her annual return). But, she does get a little break - she gets a small deduction which equates to her being taxed on only 50 of her profit, i. e. she gets 15,000 of her 30,000 bonus tax-free. In this regard, her gain is treated like a capital gain - but it is still considered employment income (why Aha - good old CCRA has a reason - read on). This is how CCRA sees it. Nice and simple. And, it often does work exactly this way. Stock options are often referred to as quotIncentive Stock Optionsquot by regulators such as stock exchanges, and they are viewed as a means for providing bonus income to employees. They are not - as many of us would like to have it - a way for employees to invest in their company. Indeed, this can be extremely dangerous. Heres a real example - many technology entrepreneurs got caught in exactly this situation. Just to be sure, I checked with the good folks at Deloitte and Touche and they confirmed that this situation can, and does, occur (often). Jim joins a company and gets 10,000 options at 1. In 5 years, the stock hits 100 (really). Jim scrapes together 10,000 and invests in the company, now holding 1 million worth of shares. In the next 2 years, the market tumbles, and the shares go to 10. He decides to sell, making a 90,000 profit. He thinks that he owes taxes on the 90K. Poor Jim In fact, he owes taxes on 990k of income (1M minus 10K). At the same time he has a capital loss of 900K. That doesnt help him because he has no other capital gains. So he now has taxes owing and payable of more than 213K (i. e. 43 marginal rate applied to 50 of the 990K). He is bankrupt So much for motivating him with incentive stock options Under the tax rules, the important point to remember is that a tax liability is assessed at the time when an option is exercised, not when the stock is actually sold. (note - in the USA, the benefit is limited to the excess of the selling price over the exercise price. In the USA, the benefit is taxed as a capital gain if the shares are held for one year prior to sale) Lets go back to the example of Jill buying Multiactive stock. If Jill wanted to keep the shares (expecting them to go up), then she would still be taxed on her 20,000 profit in her next tax return - even if she didnt sell a single share Up until recently, she would actually have to pay the tax in cash. But, a recent Federal budget change now allows for a deferral (not a forgiveness) of the tax until the time when she actually sells the shares (up to an annual limit of only 100,000. The Province of Ontario has a special deal allowing employees to earn up to 1M tax free Nice, eh). Suppose that the shares drop (no fault of hers - just the market acting up again) back to the 3.00 level. Worried that she might have no profit, she sells. She figures that she has broken even, but in fact she still owes about 8,600 in taxes (assuming a 43 marginal rate on her quotpaper profitquot at the time of exercise). Not good. But true Even worse, suppose that the stock drops to 1.00. In this case she has a capital loss of 5.00 (her cost on the shares - for tax purposes - is the 6.00 market value on the date of exercise - not her exercise price). But she can only use this 5.00 capital loss against other capital gains. She still gets no relief on her original tax bill. I wonder what happens if she never sells her shares Would her tax liability be deferred forever On the other hand, suppose that the world is rosy and bright and her shares rise to 9 at which time she sells them. In this case, she has a capital gain on 3.00 and she now has to pay her deferred tax on the original 30,000 of quotemployment incomequot. Again, this is OK. Because of the potential negative impact brought about by acquiring and holding shares, most employees are effectively forced into selling the shares immediately - i. e. on the exercise date - to avoid any adverse consequences. But, can you imagine the impact on a venture companys share price when five or six optionees quotdumpquot hundreds of thousands of shares into the market This does nothing to encourage employees to hold company shares. And it can mess up the market for a thinly traded security. From an investors perspective, theres a huge downside to options, namely dilution. This is significant. As an investor, you must remember that, on average, 20 new shares can be issued (cheaply) to optionees. From the companys perspective, the routine granting and subsequent exercising of options can quickly compound the outstanding share balance. This gives rise to quot market capitalization creep quot - a steady rise in value of the company attributable to an increased stock float. Theoretically, share prices should fall slightly as new shares are issued. However, these new shares conveniently get absorbed, especially in hot markets. As an investor, is it easy to find out what a companys outstanding options are No, its not easy and the information isnt updated regularly. The quickest way is to check a companys most recent annual information circular (available on sedar ). You should also be able to find out how many options have been granted to insiders from the insider filing reports. However, its tedious and not always reliable. Your best bet is to assume that youre going to get diluted by at least 20 every couple of years. The belief that options are better than company bonuses because the cash comes from the market, rather than from corporate cash flows, is nonsense. The long term dilutive effect is far greater, not to mention the negative impact on earnings per share. I would encourage directors of companies to limit stock option plans to a maximum of 15 of issued capital and to allow for at least a three year rotation with annual vesting arrangements in place. Annual vesting will ensure that employees who get options do indeed add value. The term optionaire has been used to describe lucky option holders with highly appreciated options. When these optionaires become real millionaires, corporate managers must ask themselves if their payouts are really justified. Why should a secretary earn a half million dollar bonus just because she had 10,000 quottokenquot options What did she risk And what about those instantly rich millionaire managers who decide to make a lifestyle change and quit their jobs Is this fair to investors Stock option rules, regulations and the taxation issues that arise are very complex. There are also substantial differences in tax treatment between private companies and public companies. Furthermore, the rules are always changing. A regular check with your tax advisor is highly recommended. So, whats the bottom line Whereas options are great, like most good things in life, I think they have to be given in moderation. As much as stock options can be a great carrot in attracting talent, they can also backfire as weve seen in the above example. And, in cases where they do really achieve their purpose, investors could argue that humungous windfalls may be unwarranted and are punitive to shareholders. Mike Volker is the Director of the UniversityIndustry Liaison Office at Simon Fraser University, Chairman of the Vancouver Enterprise Forum, and a technology entrepreneur. Copyright 2000-2003 Michael C. Volker Email: mikevolker. org - Comments and suggestions will be appreciated Updated: 030527The taxation of stock options The tax planning guide 2016-2017 The taxation of stock options As an incentive strategy, you may provide your employees with the right to acquire shares in your company at a fixed price for a limited period. Normally, the shares will be worth more than the purchase price at the time the employee exercises the option. For example, you provide one of your key employees with the option to buy 1,000 shares in the company at 5 each. This is the estimated fair market value (FMV) per share at the time the option is granted. When the stock price increases to 10, your employee exercises his option to buy the shares for 5,000. Since their current value is 10,000, he has a profit of 5,000. How is the benefit taxed The income tax consequences of exercising the option depend on whether the company granting the option is a Canadian-controlled private corporation (CCPC), the period of time the employee holds the shares before eventually selling them and whether the employee deals at arms - length with the corporation. If the company is a CCPC, there wont be any income tax consequences until the employee disposes of the shares, provided the employee is not related to the controlling shareholders of the company. In general, the difference between the FMV of the shares at the time the option was exercised and the option price (i. e. 5 per share in our example) will be taxed as employment income in the year the shares are sold. The employee can claim a deduction from taxable income equal to half this amount, if certain conditions are met. Half of the difference between the ultimate sale price and the FMV of the shares at the date the option was exercised will be reported as a taxable capital gain or allowable capital loss. Example: In 2013, your company, a CCPC, offered several of its senior employees the option to buy 1,000 shares in the company for 10 each. In 2015, its estimated that the value of the stock has doubled. Several of the employees decide to exercise their options. By 2016, the value of the stock has doubled again to 40 per share, and some of the employees decide to sell their shares. Since the company was a CCPC at the time the option was granted, theres no taxable benefit until the shares are sold in 2016. Its assumed that the conditions for the 50 deduction are satisfied. The benefit is calculated as follows: What if the stock declines in value In the above numerical example, the value of the stock increased between the time the stock was acquired and the time it was sold. But what would happen if the share value declined to 10 at the time of sale in 2016 In this case, the employee would report a net income inclusion of 5,000 and a 10,000 capital loss (5,000 allowable capital loss). Unfortunately, while the income inclusion is afforded the same tax treatment as a capital gain, it isnt actually a capital gain. Its taxed as employment income. As a result, the capital loss realized in 2016 cannot be used to offset the income inclusion resulting from the taxable benefit. Anyone in difficult financial circumstances as a result of these rules should contact their local CRA Tax Services office to determine whether special payment arrangements can be made. Public company stock options The rules are different where the company granting the option is a public company. The general rule is that the employee has to report a taxable employment benefit in the year the option is exercised. This benefit is equal to the amount by which the FMV of the shares (at the time the option is exercised) exceeds the option price paid for the shares. When certain conditions are met, a deduction equal to half the taxable benefit is allowed. For options exercised prior to 4:00 p. m. EST on March 4, 2010, eligible employees of public companies could elect to defer taxation on the resulting taxable employment benefit (subject to an annual vesting limit of 100,000). However, public company options exercised after 4:00 p. m. EST on March 4, 2010 are no longer eligible for the deferral. Some employees who took advantage of the tax deferral election experienced financial difficulties as a result of a decline in the value of the optioned securities to the point that the value of the securities was less than the deferred tax liability on the underlying stock option benefit. A special election was available so that the tax liability on the deferred stock option benefit would not exceed the proceeds of disposition for the optioned securities (two-thirds of such proceeds for residents of Quebec), provided that the securities were disposed after 2010 and before 2015, and that the election was filed by the due date of your income tax return for the year of the disposition. This site uses cookies to provide you with a more responsive and personalised service. By using this site you agree to our use of cookies. Please read our cookie notice for more information on the cookies we use and how to delete or block them. The full functionality of our site is not supported on your browser version, or you may have compatibility mode selected. Please turn off compatibility mode, upgrade your browser to at least Internet Explorer 9, or try using another browser such as Google Chrome or Mozilla Firefox. IFRS 2 Share-based Payment Quick Article Links IFRS 2 Share-based Payment requires an entity to recognise share-based payment transactions (such as granted shares, share options, or share appreciation rights) in its financial statements, including transactions with employees or other parties to be settled in cash, other assets, or equity instruments of the entity. Specific requirements are included for equity-settled and cash-settled share-based payment transactions, as well as those where the entity or supplier has a choice of cash or equity instruments. IFRS 2 was originally issued in February 2004 and first applied to annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 2005. History of IFRS 2 G41 Discussion Paper Accounting for Share-Based Payments published Comment deadline 31 October 2000 Project added to IASB agenda History of the project IASB invites comments on G41 Discussion Paper Accounting for Share-Based Payments Comment deadline 15 December 2001 Exposure Draft ED 2 Share-Based Payment published Comment deadline 7 March 2003 IFRS 2 Share-based Payment issued Effective for annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 2005 Exposure Draft Vesting Conditions and Cancellations published Comment deadline 2 June 2006 Amended by Vesting Conditions and Cancellations (Amendments to IFRS 2) Effective for annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 2009 Amended by Improvements to IFRSs (scope of IFRS 2 and revised IFRS 3) Effective for annual periods beginning on or after 1 July 2009 Amended by Group Cash-settled Share-based Payment Tra nsactions Effective for annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 2010 Amended by Annual Improvements to IFRSs 20102012 Cycle (definition of vesting condition) Effective for annual periods beginning on or after 1 July 2014 Amended by Classification and Measurement of Share-based Payment Transactions (Amendments to IFRS 2) Effective for annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 2018 Related Interpretations Amendments under consideration Summary of IFRS 2 In June 2007, the Deloitte IFRS Global Office published an updated version of our IAS Plus Guide to IFRS 2 Share-based Payment 2007 (PDF 748k, 128 pages). The guide not only explains the detailed provisions of IFRS 2 but also deals with its application in many practical situations. Because of the complexity and variety of share-based payment awards in practice, it is not always possible to be definitive as to what is the right answer. However, in this guide Deloitte shares with you our approach to finding solutions that we believe are in accordance with the objective of the Standard. Special edition of our IAS Plus newsletter You will find a four-page summary of IFRS 2 in a special edition of our IAS Plus newsletter (PDF 49k). Definition of share-based payment A share-based payment is a transaction in which the entity receives goods or services either as consideration for its equity instruments or by incurring liabilities for amounts based on the price of the entitys shares or other equity instruments of the entity. The accounting requirements for the share-based payment depend on how the transaction will be settled, that is, by the issuance of (a) equity, (b) cash, or (c) equity or cash. The concept of share-based payments is broader than employee share options. IFRS 2 encompasses the issuance of shares, or rights to shares, in return for services and goods. Examples of items included in the scope of IFRS 2 are share appreciation rights, employee share purchase plans, employee share ownership plans, share option plans and plans where the issuance of shares (or rights to shares) may depend on market or non-market related conditions. IFRS 2 applies to all entities. There is no exemption for private or smaller entities. Furthermore, subsidiaries using their parents or fellow subsidiarys equity as consideration for goods or services are within the scope of the Standard. There are two exemptions to the general scope principle: First, the issuance of shares in a business combination should be accounted for under IFRS 3 Business Combinations . However, care should be taken to distinguish share-based payments related to the acquisition from those related to continuing employee services Second, IFRS 2 does not address share-based payments within the scope of paragraphs 8-10 of IAS 32 Financial Instruments: Presentation . or paragraphs 5-7 of IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement . Therefore, IAS 32 and IAS 39 should be applied for commodity-based derivative contracts that may be settled in shares or rights to shares. IFRS 2 does not apply to share-based payment transactions other than for the acquisition of goods and services. Share dividends, the purchase of treasury shares, and the issuance of additional shares are therefore outside its scope. Recognition and measurement The issuance of shares or rights to shares requires an increase in a component of equity. IFRS 2 requires the offsetting debit entry to be expensed when the payment for goods or services does not represent an asset. The expense should be recognised as the goods or services are consumed. For example, the issuance of shares or rights to shares to purchase inventory would be presented as an increase in inventory and would be expensed only once the inventory is sold or impaired. The issuance of fully vested shares, or rights to shares, is presumed to relate to past service, requiring the full amount of the grant-date fair value to be expensed immediately. The issuance of shares to employees with, say, a three-year vesting period is considered to relate to services over the vesting period. Therefore, the fair value of the share-based payment, determined at the grant date, should be expensed over the vesting period. As a general principle, the total expense related to equity-settled share-based payments will equal the multiple of the total instruments that vest and the grant-date fair value of those instruments. In short, there is truing up to reflect what happens during the vesting period. However, if the equity-settled share-based payment has a market related performance condition, the expense would still be recognised if all other vesting conditions are met. The following example provides an illustration of a typical equity-settled share-based payment. Illustration Recognition of employee share option grant Company grants a total of 100 share options to 10 members of its executive management team (10 options each) on 1 January 20X5. These options vest at the end of a three-year period. The company has determined that each option has a fair value at the date of grant equal to 15. The company expects that all 100 options will vest and therefore records the following entry at 30 June 20X5 - the end of its first six-month interim reporting period. Dr. Share option expense (90 15) 6 periods 225 per period. 225 4 250250250 150 Depending on the type of share-based payment, fair value may be determined by the value of the shares or rights to shares given up, or by the value of the goods or services received: General fair value measurement principle. In principle, transactions in which goods or services are received as consideration for equity instruments of the entity should be measured at the fair value of the goods or services received. Only if the fair value of the goods or services cannot be measured reliably would the fair value of the equity instruments granted be used. Measuring employee share options. For transactions with employees and others providing similar services, the entity is required to measure the fair value of the equity instruments granted, because it is typically not possible to estimate reliably the fair value of employee services received. When to measure fair value - options. For transactions measured at the fair value of the equity instruments granted (such as transactions with employees), fair value should be estimated at grant date. When to measure fair value - goods and services. For transactions measured at the fair value of the goods or services received, fair value should be estimated at the date of receipt of those goods or services. Measurement guidance. For goods or services measured by reference to the fair value of the equity instruments granted, IFRS 2 specifies that, in general, vesting conditions are not taken into account when estimating the fair value of the shares or options at the relevant measurement date (as specified above). Instead, vesting conditions are taken into account by adjusting the number of equity instruments included in the measurement of the transaction amount so that, ultimately, the amount recognised for goods or services received as consideration for the equity instruments granted is based on the number of equity instruments that eventually vest. More measurement guidance. IFRS 2 requires the fair value of equity instruments granted to be based on market prices, if available, and to take into account the terms and conditions upon which those equity instruments were granted. In the absence of market prices, fair value is estimated using a valuation technique to estimate what the price of those equity instruments would have been on the measurement date in an arms length transaction between knowledgeable, willing parties. The standard does not specify which particular model should be used. If fair value cannot be reliably measured. IFRS 2 requires the share-based payment transaction to be measured at fair value for both listed and unlisted entities. IFRS 2 permits the use of intrinsic value (that is, fair value of the shares less exercise price) in those rare cases in which the fair value of the equity instruments cannot be reliably measured. However this is not simply measured at the date of grant. An entity would have to remeasure intrinsic value at each reporting date until final settlement. Performance conditions. IFRS 2 makes a distinction between the handling of market based performance conditions from non-market performance conditions. Market conditions are those related to the market price of an entitys equity, such as achieving a specified share price or a specified target based on a comparison of the entitys share price with an index of share prices of other entities. Market based performance conditions are included in the grant-date fair value measurement (similarly, non-vesting conditions are taken into account in the measurement). However, the fair value of the equity instruments is not adjusted to take into consideration non-market based performance features - these are instead taken into account by adjusting the number of equity instruments included in the measurement of the share-based payment transaction, and are adjusted each period until such time as the equity instruments vest. Note: Annual Improvements to IFRSs 20102012 Cycle amend s the definitions of vesting condition and market condition and adds definitions for performance condition and service condition (which were previously part of the definition of vesting condition). The amendments are effective for annual periods beginning on or after 1 July 2014. Modifications, cancellations, and settlements The determination of whether a change in terms and conditions has an effect on the amount recognised depends on whether the fair value of the new instruments is greater than the fair value of the original instruments (both determined at the modification date). Modification of the terms on which equity instruments were granted may have an effect on the expense that will be recorded. IFRS 2 clarifies that the guidance on modifications also applies to instruments modified after their vesting date. If the fair value of the new instruments is more than the fair value of the old instruments (e. g. by reduction of the exercise price or issuance of additional instruments), the incremental amount is recognised over the remaining vesting period in a manner similar to the original amount. If the modification occurs after the vesting period, the incremental amount is recognised immediately. If the fair value of the new instruments is less than the fair value of the old instruments, the original fair value of the equity instruments granted should be expensed as if the modification never occurred. The cancellation or settlement of equity instruments is accounted for as an acceleration of the vesting period and therefore any amount unrecognised that would otherwise have been charged should be recognised immediately. Any payments made with the cancellation or settlement (up to the fair value of the equity instruments) should be accounted for as the repurchase of an equity interest. Any payment in excess of the fair value of the equity instruments granted is recognised as an expense New equity instruments granted may be identified as a replacement of cancelled equity instruments. In those cases, the replacement equity instruments are accounted for as a modification. The fair value of the replacement equity instruments is determined at grant date, while the fair value of the cancelled instruments is determined at the date of cancellation, less any cash payments on cancellation that is accounted for as a deduction from equity. Disclosure Required disclosures include: the nature and extent of share-based payment arrangements that existed during the period how the fair value of the goods or services received, or the fair value of the equity instruments granted, during the period was determined the effect of share-based payment transactions on the entitys profit or loss for the period and on its financial position. Effective date IFRS 2 is effective for annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 2005. Earlier application is encouraged. Transition All equity-settled share-based payments granted after 7 November 2002, that are not yet vested at the effective date of IFRS 2 shall be accounted for using the provisions of IFRS 2. Entities are allowed and encouraged, but not required, to apply this IFRS to other grants of equity instruments if (and only if) the entity has previously disclosed publicly the fair value of those equity instruments determined in accordance with IFRS 2. The comparative information presented in accordance with IAS 1 shall be restated for all grants of equity instruments to which the requirements of IFRS 2 are applied. The adjustment to reflect this change is presented in the opening balance of retained earnings for the earliest period presented. IFRS 2 amends paragraph 13 of IFRS 1 First-time Adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards to add an exemption for share-based payment transactions. Similar to entities already applying IFRS, first-time adopters will have to apply IFRS 2 for share-based payment transactions on or after 7 November 2002. Additionally, a first-time adopter is not required to apply IFRS 2 to share-based payments granted after 7 November 2002 that vested before the later of (a) the date of transition to IFRS and (b) 1 January 2005. A first-time adopter may elect to apply IFRS 2 earlier only if it has publicly disclosed the fair value of the share-based payments determined at the measurement date in accordance with IFRS 2. Differences with FASB Statement 123 Revised 2004 In December 2004, the US FASB published FASB Statement 123 (revised 2004) Share-Based Payment. Statement 123(R) requires that the compensation cost relating to share-based payment transactions be recognised in financial statements. Click for FASB Press Release (PDF 17k). Deloitte (USA) has published a special issue of its Heads Up newsletter summarising the key concepts of FASB Statement No. 123(R). Click to download the Heads Up Newsletter (PDF 292k). While Statement 123(R) is largely consistent with IFRS 2, some differences remain, as described in a QampA document FASB issued along with the new Statement: Q22. Is the Statement convergent with International Financial Reporting Standards The Statement is largely convergent with International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 2, Share-based Payment. The Statement and IFRS 2 have the potential to differ in only a few areas. The more significant areas are briefly described below. IFRS 2 requires the use of the modified grant-date method for share-based payment arrangements with nonemployees. In contrast, Issue 96-18 requires that grants of share options and other equity instruments to nonemployees be measured at the earlier of (1) the date at which a commitment for performance by the counterparty to earn the equity instruments is reached or (2) the date at which the counterpartys performance is complete. IFRS 2 contains more stringent criteria for determining whether an employee share purchase plan is compensatory or not. As a result, some employee share purchase plans for which IFRS 2 requires recognition of compensation cost will not be considered to give rise to compensation cost under the Statement. IFRS 2 applies the same measurement requirements to employee share options regardless of whether the issuer is a public or a nonpublic entity. The Statement requires that a nonpublic entity account for its options and similar equity instruments based on their fair value unless it is not practicable to estimate the expected volatility of the entitys share price. In that situation, the entity is required to measure its equity share options and similar instruments at a value using the historical volatility of an appropriate industry sector index. In tax jurisdictions such as the United States, where the time value of share options generally is not deductible for tax purposes, IFRS 2 requires that no deferred tax asset be recognized for the compensation cost related to the time value component of the fair value of an award. A deferred tax asset is recognized only if and when the share options have intrinsic value that could be deductible for tax purposes. Therefore, an entity that grants an at-the-money share option to an employee in exchange for services will not recognize tax effects until that award is in-the-money. In contrast, the Statement requires recognition of a deferred tax asset based on the grant-date fair value of the award. The effects of subsequent decreases in the share price (or lack of an increase) are not reflected in accounting for the deferred tax asset until the related compensation cost is recognized for tax purposes. The effects of subsequent increases that generate excess tax benefits are recognized when they affect taxes payable. The Statement requires a portfolio approach in determining excess tax benefits of equity awards in paid-in capital available to offset write-offs of deferred tax assets, whereas IFRS 2 requires an individual instrument approach. Thus, some write-offs of deferred tax assets that will be recognized in paid-in capital under the Statement will be recognized in determining net income under IFRS 2. Differences between the Statement and IFRS 2 may be further reduced in the future when the IASB and FASB consider whether to undertake additional work to further converge their respective accounting standards on share-based payment. March 2005: SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin 107 On 29 March 2005, the staff of the US Securities and Exchange Commission issued Staff Accounting Bulletin 107 dealing with valuations and other accounting issues for share-based payment arrangements by public companies under FASB Statement 123R Share-Based Payment. For public companies, valuations under Statement 123R are similar to those under IFRS 2 Share-based Payment. SAB 107 provides guidance related to share-based payment transactions with nonemployees, the transition from nonpublic to public entity status, valuation methods (including assumptions such as expected volatility and expected term), the accounting for certain redeemable financial instruments issued under share-based payment arrangements, the classification of compensation expense, non-GAAP financial measures, first-time adoption of Statement 123R in an interim period, capitalisation of compensation cost related to share-based payment arrangements, accounting for the income tax effects of share-based payment arrangements on adoption of Statement 123R, the modification of employee share options prior to adoption of Statement 123R, and disclosures in Managements Discussion and Analysis (MDampA) subsequent to adoption of Statement 123R. One of the interpretations in SAB 107 is whether there are differences between Statement 123R and IFRS 2 that would result in a reconciling item: Question: Does the staff believe there are differences in the measurement provisions for share-based payment arrangements with employees under International Accounting Standards Board International Financial Reporting Standard 2, Share-based Payment (IFRS 2) and Statement 123R that would result in a reconciling item under Item 17 or 18 of Form 20-F Interpretive Response: The staff believes that application of the guidance provided by IFRS 2 regarding the measurement of employee share options would generally result in a fair value measurement that is consistent with the fair value objective stated in Statement 123R. Accordingly, the staff believes that application of Statement 123Rs measurement guidance would not generally result in a reconciling item required to be reported under Item 17 or 18 of Form 20-F for a foreign private issuer that has complied with the provisions of IFRS 2 for share-based payment transactions with employees. However, the staff reminds foreign private issuers that there are certain differences between the guidance in IFRS 2 and Statement 123R that may result in reconciling items. Footnotes omitted Click to download: March 2005: Bear, Stearns Study on Impact of Expensing Stock Options in the United States If US public companies had been required to expense employee stock options in 2004, as will be required under FASB Statement 123R Share-Based Payment starting in third-quarter 2005: the reported 2004 post-tax net income from continuing operations of the SampP 500 companies would have been reduced by 5, and 2004 NASDAQ 100 post-tax net income from continuing operations would have been reduced by 22. Those are key findings of a study conducted by the Equity Research group at Bear, Stearns amp Co. Inc. The purpose of the study is to help investors gauge the impact that expensing employee stock options will have on the 2005 earnings of US public companies. The Bear, Stearns analysis was based on the 2004 stock option disclosures in the most recently filed 10Ks of companies that were SampP 500 and NASDAQ 100 constituents as of 31 December 2004. Exhibits to the study present the results by company, by sector, and by industry. Visitors to IAS Plus are likely to find the study of interest because the requirements of FAS 123R for public companies are very similar to those of IFRS 2. We are grateful to Bear, Stearns for giving us permission to post the study on IAS Plus. The report remains copyright Bear, Stears amp Co. Inc. all rights reserved. Click to download 2004 Earnings Impact of Stock Options on the SampP 500 amp NASDAQ 100 Earnings (PDF 486k). November 2005: Standard amp Poors Study on Impact of Expensing Stock Options In November 2005 Standard amp Poors published a report of the impact of expensing stock options on the SampP 500 companies. FAS 123(R) requires expensing of stock options (mandatory for most SEC registrants in 2006). IFRS 2 is nearly identical to FAS 123(R). SampP found: Option expense will reduce SampP 500 earnings by 4.2. Information Technology is affected the most, reducing earnings by 18. PE ratios for all sectors will be increased, but will remain below historical averages. The impact of option expensing on the Standard amp Poors 500 will be noticeable, but in an environment of record earnings, high margins and historically low operating price-to-earnings ratios, the index is in its best position in decades to absorb the additional expense. SampP takes issue with those companies that try to emphasise earnings before deducting stock option expense and with those analysts who ignore option expensing. The report emphasises that: Standard amp Poors will include and report option expense in all of its earnings values, across all of its business lines. This includes Operating, As Reported and Core, and applies to its analytical work in the SampP Domestic Indices, Stock Reports, as well as its forward estimates. It includes all of its electronic products. The investment community benefits when it has clear and consistent information and analyses. A consistent earnings methodology that builds on accepted accounting standards and procedures is a vital component of investing. By supporting this definition, Standard amp Poors is contributing to a more reliable investment environment. The current debate as to the presentation by companies of earnings that exclude option expense, generally being referred to as non-GAAP earnings, speaks to the heart of corporate governance. Additionally, many equity analysts are being encouraged to base their estimates on non-GAAP earnings. While we do not expect a repeat of the EBBS (Earnings Before Bad Stuff) pro-forma earnings of 2001, the ability to compare issues and sectors depends on an accepted set of accounting rules observed by all. In order to make informed investment decisions, the investing community requires data that conform to accepted accounting procedures. Of even more concern is the impact that such alternative presentation and calculations could have on the reduced level of faith and trust investors put into company reporting. The corporate governance events of the last two-years have eroded the trust of many investors, trust that will take years to earn back. In an era of instant access and carefully scripted investor releases, trust is now a major issue. January 2008: Amendment of IFRS 2 to clarify vesting conditions and cancellations On 17 January 2008, the IASB published final amendments to IFRS 2 Share-based Payment to clarify the terms vesting conditions and cancellations as follows: Vesting conditions are service conditions and performance conditions only. Other features of a share-based payment are not vesting conditions. Under IFRS 2, features of a share-based payment that are not vesting conditions should be included in the grant date fair value of the share-based payment. The fair value also includes market-related vesting conditions. All cancellations, whether by the entity or by other parties, should receive the same accounting treatment. Under IFRS 2, a cancellation of equity instruments is accounted for as an acceleration of the vesting period. Therefore any amount unrecognised that would otherwise have been charged is recognised immediately. Any payments made with the cancellation (up to the fair value of the equity instruments) is accounted for as the repurchase of an equity interest. Any payment in excess of the fair value of the equity instruments granted is recognised as an expense. The Board had proposed the amendment in an exposure draft on 2 February 2006. The amendment is effective for annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 2009, with earlier application permitted. Deloitte has published a Special Edition of our IAS Plus Newsletter explaining the amendments to IFRS 2 for vesting conditions and cancellations (PDF 126k). June 2009: IASB amends IFRS 2 for group cash-settled share-based payment transactions, withdraws IFRICs 8 and 11 On 18 June 2009, the IASB issued amendments to IFRS 2 Share-based Payment that clarify the accounting for group cash-settled share-based payment transactions. The amendments clarify how an individual subsidiary in a group should account for some share-based payment arrangements in its own financial statements. In these arrangements, the subsidiary receives goods or services from employees or suppliers but its parent or another entity in the group must pay those suppliers. The amendments make clear that: An entity that receives goods or services in a share-based payment arrangement must account for those goods or services no matter which entity in the group settles the transaction, and no matter whether the transaction is settled in shares or cash. In IFRS 2 a group has the same meaning as in IAS 27 Consolidated and Separate Financial Statements . that is, it includes only a parent and its subsidiaries. The amendments to IFRS 2 also incorporate guidance previously included in IFRIC 8 Scope of IFRS 2 and IFRIC 11 IFRS 2Group and Treasury Share Transactions . As a result, the IASB has withdrawn IFRIC 8 and IFRIC 11. The amendments are effective for annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 2010 and must be applied retrospectively. Earlier application is permitted. Click for IASB press release (PDF 103k). June 2016: IASB clarifies the classification and measurement of share-based payment transactions On 20 June 2016, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) published final amendments to IFRS 2 that clarify the classification and measurement of share-based payment transactions: Accounting for cash-settled share-based payment transactions that include a performance condition Until now, IFRS 2 contained no guidance on how vesting conditions affect the fair value of liabilities for cash-settled share-based payments. IASB has now added guidance that introduces accounting requirements for cash-settled share-based payments that follows the same approach as used for equity-settled share-based payments. Classification of share-based payment transactions with net settlement features IASB has introduced an exception into IFRS 2 so that a share-based payment where the entity settles the share-based payment arrangement net is classified as equity-settled in its entirety provided the share-based payment would have been classified as equity-settled had it not included the net settlement feature. Accounting for modifications of share-based payment transactions from cash-settled to equity-settled Until now, IFRS 2 did not specifically address situations where a cash-settled share-based payment changes to an equity-settled share-based payment because of modifications of the terms and conditions. The IASB has intoduced the following clarifications: On such modifications, the original liability recognised in respect of the cash-settled share-based payment is derecognised and the equity-settled share-based payment is recognised at the modification date fair value to the extent services have been rendered up to the modification date. Any difference between the carrying amount of the liability as at the modification date and the amount recognised in equity at the same date would be recognised in profit and loss immediately. Material on this website is 2017 Deloitte Global Services Limited, or a member firm of Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited, or one of their related entities. See Legal for additional copyright and other legal information. Deloitte refers to one or more of Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited, a UK private company limited by guarantee (DTTL), its network of member firms, and their related entities. 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